Stable Coalition Structures in Simple Games with Veto Control

B.B. Ciftci and Dinko Dimitrov
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B.B. Ciftci: Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research

No 2006-114, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: Banzhaf value; hedonic game; semi-value; Shapley value; simple game; strict core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control (2011)
Working Paper: Stable Coalition Structures in Simple Games with Veto Control (2006)
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