Experiments on cooperation, institutions, and social preferences
Additional contact information
Xue Xu: Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management
Other publications TiSEM from Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management
This thesis consists of three chapters in experimental economics. It involves various dimensions in which laboratory experiments can play a role: testing the validity of a game theory, helping understand institutions, and measuring (the change in) social preferences. It relates to the effects of different institutions on cooperation and social preferences. Chapter 2 studies to what extent an overlapping membership structure, which in theory affects the incentives of short-lived players, is conducive to cooperation. Chapter 3 examines whether the presence of decentralized punishment, especially the possibility of retaliating a centralized enforcer, has an impact on the decisions of the enforcer and group cooperation. Chapter 4 studies whether interactions with out-group members matter for in-group-out-group differences in altruism and whether the nature of these interactions matters for in-group-out-group differences.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tiu:tiutis:d3cf4dba-b0f3-4643-a267-78718dacc773
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Other publications TiSEM from Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Richard Broekman ().