Land Tenure Security and Home Maintenance: Evidence from Japan

Shinichiro Iwata and Hisaki Yamaga
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Shinichiro Iwata: Faculty of Economics, University of Toyama

No CIRJE-F-520, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: This paper considers two land tenure modes. leasehold and freehold. and models housing maintenance incentives under land tenure security in Japan. Compared with freeholders, leaseholders are equally likely to remain in the premises, but spend less on home maintenance, because leaseholders are not full residual claimants, even under land tenure security. The empirical results show that maintenance expenditures of leaseholders are about 30% lower than those of freeholders in the Japanese residential land market. Empirical evidence also indicates that leaseholders are equally likely to remain in their premises even when they undermaintain their dwellings.

Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2007-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Land Tenure Security and Home Maintenance: Evidence from Japan (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2007cf520

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