Land Tenure Security and Home Maintenance: Evidence from Japan
Shinichiro Iwata and
Hisaki Yamaga
Land Economics, 2009, vol. 85, issue 3, 429-441
Abstract:
Land tenure security law in Japan gives leaseholders a dual right: either they can renew the lease at the market rent, or they can make a claim on the landowner to purchase the premises at the market price. There is, however, a market imperfection because of the fact that leaseholders must incur a transaction cost in exercising the right of claim. Therefore, leaseholders are not full residual claimants even under land tenure security. Under this condition, we find theoretically and empirically that compared with freeholders, leaseholders are equally likely to remain in the premises, but they spend less on maintenance.
JEL-codes: K11 R38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Working Paper: Land Tenure Security and Home Maintenance: Evidence from Japan (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:landec:v:85:y:2009:i:3:p:429-441
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