Strategy-proof and anonymous allocation mechanisms in economies with an indivisible good

Zhen Zhao

No 52, TUPD Discussion Papers from Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University

Abstract: We study the problem of allocating a single indivisible good to at most one of n agents when the preferences of agents' are quasilinear, monetary transfers are allowed and strategy-proof mechanism is needed. In this paper, we consider the possibility of constructing feasible allocation mechanisms which satisfy strategy-proofness, anonymity, budget balance and no wastage. In two and three agents cases, we show an impossibility result.

Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2024-09-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:toh:tupdaa:52

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