Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments

Alexander Kovalenkov () and Myrna Wooders

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility. Under the assumption that the payoff set of the grand coalition is convex, we show that a game with limited side payments has a nonempty epsilon-core. Our main result is that, when some degree of side-paymentness within nearly-effective small groups is assumed, then all payoffs in the epsilon-core treat similar players similarly. A bound on the distance between epsilon-core payoffs of any two similar players is given in terms of the parameters describing the game. These results add to the literature showing that games with many players and small effective groups have the properties of competitive markets.

JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2000-07-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments (1999)
Working Paper: Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments (1999)
Working Paper: Epsilon Cores of Games and Economies With Limited Side Payments (1997)
Working Paper: Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:mwooders-00-02

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