Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments

Alexander Kovalenkovy and Myrna Wooders

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility. Under the assumption that the payoff set of the grand coalition is convex, we show that a game with limited side payments has a nonempty E-core. Our main result is that, when some degree of side-paymentness within nearly-effective small groups is assumed, then all payoffs in the E-core treat similar players similarly. A bound on the distance between E-core payoffs of any two similar players is given in terms of the parameters describing the game. These results add to the literature showing that games with many players and small effective groups have the properties of competitive markets.

Keywords: cooperative games; equal treatment; core convergence; games without side payments (NTU games); large games; approximate cores; effective small groups; parameterized collections of games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1999
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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp536.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments (2000)
Working Paper: Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments (1999)
Working Paper: Epsilon Cores of Games and Economies With Limited Side Payments (1997)
Working Paper: Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:536

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