Multiplicity of Equilibria and Information Structures in Empirical Games: Challenges and Prospects
Ron Borkovsky,
Paul Ellickson,
Brett Gordon (),
Victor Aguirregabiria () and
Gardete Pedro
Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics
Abstract:
Empirical models of strategic games are central to much analysis in marketing and economics. However, two challenges in applying these models to real world data are that such models often admit multiple equilibria and that they require strong informational assumptions. The first implies that the model does not make unique predictions about the data, and the second implies that results may be driven by strong a priori assumptions about the informational setup. This article summarizes recent work that seeks to address both issues and suggests some avenues for future research.
Keywords: Empirical games; Structural estimation; Multiple Equilibria; Biased Beliefs; Information structures; Learning in games; Identification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C51 C57 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: Unknown pages
Date: 2014-05-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-ore
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Multiplicity of equilibria and information structures in empirical games: challenges and prospects (2015) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-510
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