Meetings and Mechanisms
Pieter Gautier () and
Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics
We analyze a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms. A general meeting technology governs how buyers and sellers meet. We introduce a one-to-one transformation of this meeting technology that helps to clarify and extend many of the existing results in the literature, which has focused on two special cases: urn-ball and bilateral meetings. We show that the optimal mechanism for sellers is to post auctions combined with a reserve price equal to their own valuation and an appropriate fee (or subsidy) which is paid by (or to) all buyers meeting the seller. Even when there are externalities in the meeting process, the equilibrium is efficient. Finally, we analyze the sorting patterns between heterogeneous buyers and sellers and show under which conditions high-value sellers attract more high-value buyers in expectation.
Keywords: search frictions; matching function; meeting technology; competing mechanisms; heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/tecipa-588.pdf Main Text (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-588
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario.
Series data maintained by RePEc Maintainer ().