Meetings and Mechanisms

Xiaoming Cai, Pieter Gautier and Ronald Wolthoff

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we construct a framework to investigate how the way in which market participants meet each other affects outcomes like equilibrium trading mechanisms and allocations. We do so in an environment in which identical sellers post mechanisms to compete for buyers with ex-ante heterogeneous private valuations. We show that the market may segment into multiple submarkets, each consisting of all sellers posting a particular mechanism and all buyers deciding to visit those sellers. Under mild conditions, high-valuation buyers are all located in the same submarket. Then, we establish under what conditions, low valuation buyers are in: (i) the same submarket, (ii) a different submarket and (iii) a mixture of (i) and (ii). The decentralized equilibrium is always efficient when sellers can post auctions with reserve prices or entry fees.

Keywords: search frictions; directed search; matching function; meeting technology; competing mechanisms; competing auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: Unknown pages
Date: 2022-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/tecipa-727.pdf Main Text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS (2023)
Working Paper: Meetings and Mechanisms (2017)
Working Paper: Meetings and Mechanisms (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-727

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by RePEc Maintainer ().