Firm Size, Economic Situation and Influence Activities
Matthias Kräkel
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich
Abstract:
This paper discusses the optimal firm size in the presence of influence activities, and the level of individual rent-seeking dependent on the economic situation of the firm. Since firm size has a discouraging effect on the level of individual rent-seeking but also a quantity effect as the number of rent-seekers increases, the interplay of both effects determines whether the employer chooses an inefficiently small or large firm size. In the given setting, a bad economic situation leads to both a higher probability of a substantial loss and a reduction of productivity. The productivity effect and the two other effects together determine the optimal level of individual rent-seeking.
Keywords: economic situation; firm size; influence activities; politicking; rent-seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D2 L2 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Working Paper: Firm Size, Economic Situation and Influence Activities (2006) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trf:wpaper:167
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