Standards, Innovation Incentives, and the Formation of Patent Pools

Klaus Schmidt ()

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: Technological standards give rise to a complements problem that affects pricing and innovation incentives of technology producers. In this paper I discuss how patent pools can be used to solve these problems and what incentives patent holders have to form a patent pool. I offer some suggestions how competition authorities can foster the formation of welfare increasing patent pools.

Keywords: Patent pools; standard setting organisations; innovation; complements problem; patent thicket (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L15 L24 O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-tid
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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