Investment in Risk Protection and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

Federico Fornasari (), Matteo Ploner and Ivan Soraperra

No 1503, CEEL Working Papers from Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia

Abstract: We investigate investment in risk protection when risk affects either the decision maker or another individual and when the cost to offset risk is borne either by the decision maker or by another individual. We assess be- havior in the experiment against predictions obtained from a well-known social preferences model. In line with our predictions, we find that in- dividuals invest more of others� resources than of their own resources to protect themselves, and individuals invest more of their own resources in risk protection when risk is borne by themselves than when risk is borne by the others. Furthermore, individuals invest more in risk protection when delegated to choose for others than when choosing for themselves.

Keywords: social preferences; risk; laboratory experiments; delegated choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 D80 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www-ceel.economia.unitn.it/papers/papero15_03.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trn:utwpce:1503

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEEL Working Papers from Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marco Tecilla ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).