Equilibrium unemployment as a worker insurance device: Worker insurance and wage setting in worker owned enterprises
Marina Albanese (),
Cecilia Navarra () and
Ermanno Tortia ()
No 2017/09, DEM Working Papers from Department of Economics and Management
Shapiro and Stiglitz model on efficiency wages shows that worker owned firms perform higher levels of wage and employment than in investor owner firms, but empirical evidence doesnâ€™t support the first result. Starting by the economic literature on workers cooperatives we extend the Shapiro and Stiglitzâ€™s analysis by introducing horizontal control among worker members and employer opportunism. Our results reconcile theory and empirical record showing how in cooperatives both unemployment and wages can be lower than in investor owned companies.
Keywords: efficiency wage; contract failure; asymmetric information; moral hazard; worker owned enterprises (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D86 J31 J54 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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