Foreign Owners and the Quality of Industrial Relations in Germany

Verena Dill () and Uwe Jirjahn

No 2013-07, Research Papers in Economics from University of Trier, Department of Economics

Abstract: German works councils provide a highly developed mechanism for codetermination designed to increase trust and cooperation within firms. This study examines whether or not the functioning of works councils depends on the type of ownership. Comparing domestic- and foreign-owned firms in Germany, we find that works councils and managers in foreign-owned firms are less likely to cooperate. The finding fits the notion that the activities of foreign multinational companies can involve tensions with the institutional framework of the host country.

Keywords: Corporate Globalization; Foreign Ownership; Works Council; Codetermination; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 J50 J53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-int and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Foreign owners and the quality of industrial relations in Germany (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trr:wpaper:201307

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