Western Sanctions and Coups d’État

Pascal Langer

No 2024-14, Research Papers in Economics from University of Trier, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between Western sanctions and coups d’état in targeted countries. Employing a panel logit model and utilizing data from 1972 to 2013 drawn from the Global Sanctions Database and the Coup Leaders Dataset, we analyze the effects of Western sanctions on both occurrence of coups and successful coups. Western sanctions are found to initially increase the likelihood of coups by more than 4.0 pp with a diminishing impact over time. In the post-Cold War era, Western sanctions raise the probability of coups by 1.7 pp and successful coups by even 2.1 pp. The effects are particularly pronounced in non-democratic regimes, especially in personalist authoritarian regimes.

Keywords: Sanctions; Coups d’État (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F51 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-int
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trr:wpaper:202414

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