Does a veil of ignorance trigger the inner Kantian in us?

Ingela Alger and José Ignacio Rivero-Wildemauwe

No 24-161, IAST Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST)

Abstract: Theoretical work shows that in social interactions Kantian (or universalization) concerns sometimes yield starkly different behavioral predictions than other-regarding motives. We hypothesize that in interactions with different roles, Kantian concerns are awakened through awareness of a possible role reversal. An experiment varying the salience of role uncertainty is conducted to test this hypothesis, and to disentangle Kantian concerns from other-regard. Partic-ipants decide whether to “sell a lemon” to a willing buyer (akin to a Dictator Game with taking), either behind the veil of ignorance as to the role distribution, or after simply being informed of their role as “seller”. Based on the old hypothesis that markets promote selfishness, we also vary the wording used to describe decisions: we implement a Market frame and a Neutral frame. Role uncertainty salience does promote pro-social behaviors (in both frames), and selfish behavior is enhanced under the Market frame. Structural estimates of the preference parameters indicate that this is driven by a reduced other-regard under the Market frame, as moral concerns are of roughly the same intensity under both frames.

Keywords: Kantian concerns; social preferences; market framing; lemons, experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05, Revised 2025-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo and nep-exp
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Working Paper: Does a veil of ignorance trigger the inner Kantian in us? (2025)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:iastwp:129329

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