A General Solution to the Quasi Linear Screening Problem

Jean Rochet, Guillaume Carlier, Xavier Dupuis and John Thanassoulis

No 24-1537, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We provide an algorithm for solving multidimensional screening problems which are intractable analytically. The algorithm is a primal-dual algorithm which alternates between optimising the primal problem of the surplus extracted by the principal and the dual problem of the optimal assignment to deliver to the agents for a given surplus. We illustrate the algorithm by solving (i) the generic monopolist price discrimination problem and (ii) an optimal tax problem covering income and savings taxes when citizens differ in multiple dimensions.

Keywords: Multidimensional screening; algorithm; numerical methods; price discrimination; optimal tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 D42 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-inv and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: A general solution to the quasi linear screening problem (2024)
Working Paper: A General Solution to the Quasi Linear Screening Problem (2024)
Working Paper: A general solution to the quasi linear screening problem (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:129347

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