A general solution to the quasi linear screening problem

Guillaume Carlier, Xavier Dupuis, Jean Rochet and John Thanassoulis

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2024, vol. 114, issue C

Abstract: We provide an algorithm for solving multidimensional screening problems which are intractable analytically. The algorithm is a primal–dual algorithm which alternates between optimizing the primal problem of the surplus extracted by the principal and the dual problem of the optimal assignment to deliver to the agents for a given surplus. We illustrate the algorithm by solving (i) the generic monopolist price discrimination problem and (ii) an optimal tax problem covering income and savings taxes when citizens differ in multiple dimensions.

Keywords: Multidimensional screening; Algorithm; Numerical methods; Price discrimination; Optimal tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 D42 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Related works:
Working Paper: A General Solution to the Quasi Linear Screening Problem (2024)
Working Paper: A general solution to the quasi linear screening problem (2024)
Working Paper: A General Solution to the Quasi Linear Screening Problem (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:114:y:2024:i:c:s0304406824000855

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103025

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