Do Spouses Cooperate? And If Not: Why?

Francois Cochard, Hélène Couprie () and Astrid Hopfensitz

No 09-134, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: Models of household economics require an understanding of economic interactions in families. Social ties, repetition and reduced strategic uncertainty make social dilemmas in couples a very special case that needs to be empirically studied. In this paper we present results from a large economic experiment with 100 maritally living couples. Participants made decisions in a social dilemma with their partner and with a stranger. We predict behavior in this task with individual and couples' socio-demographic variables, efficiency preferences and couples' marital satisfaction. As opposed to models explaining behavior amongst strangers, the regressions on couples’ decisions highlight clear patterns concerning cooperation behavior which could inspire future household decision-making models.

Keywords: noncooperative games; laboratory; individual behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Working Paper: Do Spouses Cooperate? And If Not: Why? (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:22255

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