Economic Science and Political Influence

Gilles Saint-Paul

No 12-365, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: When policymakers and private agents use models, the economists who de- sign the model have an incentive to alter it in order infuence outcomes in a fashion consistent with their own preferences. I discuss some consequences of the existence of such ideological bias. In particular, I analyze the role of mea- surement infrastructures such as national statisticall institutes, the extent to which intellectual competition between different schools of thought may lead to polarization of views over some parameters and at the same time to consensus over other parameters, and finally how the attempt to preserve influence can lead to degenerative research programs.

Keywords: Ideology; Macroeconomics modelling; Self-confirming equilibria; Polarization; Autocoherent Models; Intellectual Competition; Degenerative Research programs; Identification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A11 E6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-11
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Related works:
Journal Article: ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE (2013)
Working Paper: Economic science and political influence (2013)
Working Paper: Economic science and political influence (2013)
Working Paper: Economic Science and Political Influence (2012)
Working Paper: Economic Science and Political Influence (2012)
Working Paper: Economic Science and Political Influence (2012)
Working Paper: Economic Science and Political Influence (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:26617

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