Economic Science and Political Influence

Gilles Saint-Paul

No 9263, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: When policymakers and private agents use models, the economists who design the model have an incentive to alter it in order influence outcomes in a fashion consistent with their own preferences. I discuss some consequences of the existence of such ideological bias. In particular, I analyze the role of measurement infrastructures such as national statistical institutes, the extent to which intellectual competition between different schools of thought may lead to polarization of views over some parameters and at the same time to consensus over other parameters, and finally how the attempt to preserve influence can lead to degenerative research programs.

Keywords: Autocoherent models; Degenerative research programs; Identification; Ideology; Intellectual competition; Macroeconomic modelling; Polarization; Self-confirming equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A11 E6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-sog
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Related works:
Journal Article: ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE (2013)
Working Paper: Economic science and political influence (2013)
Working Paper: Economic science and political influence (2013)
Working Paper: Economic Science and Political Influence (2012)
Working Paper: Economic Science and Political Influence (2012)
Working Paper: Economic Science and Political Influence (2012)
Working Paper: Economic Science and Political Influence (2012)
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