Collusion et possibilité d’entrée en aval dans une industrie verticalement intégrée

Eric Avenel and Stephane Caprice

No 15-613, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We analyze the impact of an entry threat at the downstream level on the ability of a pair of vertically integrated incumbents to collude. Entrants depend on the vertically integrated firms on the intermediate market for the purchasing of good. While the entry threat leaves collusion profits unchanged, we show that deviation profits are also unchanged and that profits are lower in the punishment periods. Consequently, an entry threat facilitates collusion, thus benefiting to incumbents.

JEL-codes: D43 L13 L23 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Collusion et possibilité d’entrée en aval dans une industrie verticalement intégrée (2018)
Working Paper: Collusion et possibilité d’entrée en aval dans une industrie verticalement intégrée (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:29970

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