Vertical Foreclosure and Multi-Segment Competition

Bruno Jullien, Markus Reisinger and Patrick Rey

No 17-876, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: This paper analyzes a supplier's incentives to foreclose downstream entry when entrants have stronger positions in different market segments, thus bringing added value as well as competition. We first consider the case where wholesale contracts take the form of linear tariffs, and characterize the conditions under which the competition-intensifying effect dominates, thereby leading to foreclosure. We then show that foreclosure can still occur with non-linear tari¤s, even coupled with additional provisions such as resale price maintenance.

Keywords: Foreclosure; Vertical Contracting; Customer Segments; Downstream Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 K21 L12 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-ind, nep-law and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/docu ... /2017/wp_tse_876.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Vertical foreclosure and multi-segment competition (2018)
Working Paper: Vertical foreclosure and multi-segment competition (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:32305

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().