Matching, cooperation and HIV in the couple
Jean-Paul Azam and
Elodie Djemai ()
No 19-991, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
We examine how cooperation within the couple protects the partners from HIV infection using survey data from southern Africa. The respective impacts of education and cooperation on HIV risk for both wives and husbands are estimated in a joint estimation model. We fully discuss and test the conflictual approach of the couple against a cooperative framework derived from a simple matching model. Our findings suggest that the larger the number of decisions husbands and wives jointly make, the less likely it is that they are infected with HIV. This is robust to assuming that cooperation is endogenous in the wife equation. Freedom and trust are also significantly related to the likelihood of infection for both partners while the women's views about whether marital violence is acceptable are not. These effects may come from a reduced likelihood of extramarital affairs among men and women living in more cooperative partnerships.
Keywords: Couples; Matching; HIV infection; Education; Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/docu ... /2019/wp_tse_991.pdf Full text (application/pdf)
Working Paper: Matching, Cooperation and HIV in the Couple (2019)
Working Paper: Matching, cooperation and HIV in the couple (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:33357
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().