An efficient nonmarket institution under imperfect markets: Labor sharing for tropical forest clearing

Yoshito Takasaki, Oliver T. Coomes, Christian Abizaid and St?phanie Brisson

Tsukuba Economics Working Papers from Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba

Abstract: This article examines the substitutability, efficiency, and evolution of an important nonmarket institution in agrarian societies ? labor sharing. From analyses of field-level data on forest clearing through time among shifting cultivators in the Peruvian Amazon, we find: (1) no productivity difference and unitary elasticities of substitution among family, hired, and cooperative labor, i.e., perfect substitutes; (2) the combination of labor market and sharing makes total labor use unconstrained by household and network endowments, i.e., efficient labor allocation; and (3) as labor composition is constrained by network endowments and liquidity, credit policies alter not only labor composition, but also network formation.

Date: 2011-12, Revised 2012-01
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Journal Article: An Efficient Nonmarket Institution under Imperfect Markets: Labor Sharing for Tropical Forest Clearing (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tsu:tewpjp:2011-007

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