An Efficient Nonmarket Institution under Imperfect Markets: Labor Sharing for Tropical Forest Clearing

Yoshito Takasaki, Oliver T. Coomes, Christian Abizaid and Stéphanie Brisson

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2014, vol. 96, issue 3, 711-732

Abstract: This article examines the substitutability, productivity, efficiency, and evolution of an important agrarian nonmarket institution-labor sharing. Analysis of field-level data on forest clearing through time among Amazonian shifting cultivators reveals that (a) family, hired, and cooperative labor are perfect substitutes, and hired and cooperative labor are equally productive, and both are more productive than family labor; (b) the combination of labor market and labor sharing makes productivity-adjusted total labor use unconstrained by household and network endowments (i.e., efficient labor allocation); and (c) as labor composition is constrained by network endowments and liquidity, credit policies alter both labor composition and labor network formation.

Date: 2014
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Working Paper: An efficient nonmarket institution under imperfect markets: Labor sharing for tropical forest clearing (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:96:y:2014:i:3:p:711-732.

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