40 Years of Tax Evasion Games: A Meta-Analysis

James Alm () and Antoine Malézieux

No 2004, Working Papers from Tulane University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We collect individual participant data from 70 papers that use laboratory experiments to examine individual tax evasion behavior (or "Tax Evasion Games"), in order to use meta-analysis to estimate the impacts of different public policy, experimental design and individual level variables on tax evasion choices. Our results show that standard enforcement variables like audits (including audit rules) and fines perform differently on the extensive and intensive margins. We find that other fiscal variables like a flat tax system, tax rates, and tax amnesties have unambiguous negative impacts on tax compliance, and that specific features of the experimental setting, such as how subjects are directed to report income, or whether taxes are redistributed to the participants or to a real life public good, have significant impacts on tax compliance. Our results also indicate that the demographic characteristics of the subjects (e.g., gender, experimental income, occupation, risk attitude) affect compliance.

Keywords: Tax evasion; Tax compliance; Meta-Analysis. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 H0 H3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-exp, nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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http://repec.tulane.edu/RePEc/pdf/tul2004.pdf First Version, August 2020 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: 40 years of tax evasion games: a meta-analysis (2021)
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