EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

40 years of tax evasion games: a meta-analysis

James Alm () and Antoine Malézieux

Experimental Economics, 2021, vol. 24, issue 3, No 1, 699-750

Abstract: Abstract We collect individual participant data from 70 papers that use laboratory experiments to examine individual tax evasion behavior (or “Tax Evasion Games”), in order to use meta-analysis to estimate the impacts of different public policy, experimental design and individual level variables on tax evasion choices. Our results show that standard enforcement variables like audits (including audit rules) and fines perform differently on the extensive and intensive margins. We find that other fiscal variables like a flat tax system, tax rates, and tax amnesties have unambiguous negative impacts on tax compliance, and that specific features of the experimental setting, such as how subjects are directed to report income, or whether taxes are redistributed to the participants or to a real life public good, have significant impacts on tax compliance. Our results also indicate that the demographic characteristics of the subjects (e.g., gender, experimental income, occupation, risk attitude) affect compliance.

Keywords: Tax evasion; Tax compliance; Meta-analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 H0 H3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10683-020-09679-3 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: 40 Years of Tax Evasion Games: A Meta-Analysis (2020) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:expeco:v:24:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s10683-020-09679-3

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/10683/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-020-09679-3

Access Statistics for this article

Experimental Economics is currently edited by David J. Cooper, Lata Gangadharan and Charles N. Noussair

More articles in Experimental Economics from Springer, Economic Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2022-11-10
Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:24:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s10683-020-09679-3