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Legislative Cycles in Semipresidential Systems

Nicolas Gavoille () and Fabio Padovano ()

Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS from Condorcet Center for political Economy

Abstract: The Political Legislation Cycle theory predicts a peak of legislative production in the pre-electoral period, when the legislator focuses on voters’ welfare to be reelected. This paper tests the theory on the French semipresidential system, characterized by direct election of both the executive and the legislature. We use a dataset that encompasses all the approved voted legis-lation in France from 1959 to 2012 at a monthly rate, and find a dual cycle of the production of laws, connected to both the presidential and the legislative elections.

Keywords: Political; Legislation; Cycle; -; Legislative; production; -; Economic; theory; of; legislation; -Semipresidential; government; system; -; Hierarchical; Poisson; regression (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 C49 H61 H62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: Legislative Cycles in a Semipresidential System (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Legislative Cycles in a Semipresidential System (2017)
Working Paper: The Dual Political Legislation Cycle in France (2014) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tut:cccrwp:2016-01-ccr

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CREM (UMR CNRS 6211) - Faculty of Economics, 7 place Hoche, 35065 Rennes Cedex - France

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