Legislative Cycles in a Semipresidential System
Fabio Padovano () and
Nicolas Gavoille ()
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2017, vol. 173, issue 3, 470-497
The political-legislation-cycle theory predicts a peak of legislative production in the pre-electoral period, when the legislator focuses on voters' welfare in order to be reelected. This paper tests the theory on the French semipresidential system, characterized by direct election of both the executive and the legislative branch. We use a data set that encompasses all the legislation passed in France from 1959 to 2012 at a monthly rate, and find a dual cycle of the production of laws, connected to both the presidential and the legislative elections.
JEL-codes: D72 C49 H61 H62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Legislative Cycles in a Semipresidential System (2017)
Working Paper: Legislative Cycles in Semipresidential Systems (2016)
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