Does Bargaining Matter in the Small Firm’s Matching Model?

Olivier Lharidon, Franck Malherbet and Sebastien Perez-Duarte
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Olivier Lharidon: University of Rennes 1 - CREM-CNRS
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Olivier L'Haridon

Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) from Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS

Abstract: In this article, we use a stylized model of the labor market to investigate the effects of three alternative and well-known bargaining solutions. We apply the Nash, the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions in the small firm’s matching model of unemployment. We first show that the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are easily implementable within search-matching economies. Second, we show that the differences between the three solution are weaker than expected. This contrasts with some of the main results obtained by the recent literature.

Keywords: appariement; négociations; jeux coopératifs. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 J20 J60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-gth and nep-lab
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Related works:
Journal Article: Does bargaining matter in the small firms matching model? (2013)
Working Paper: Does bargaining matter in the small firms matching model? (2013)
Working Paper: Does bargaining matter in the small firm's matching model? (2011)
Working Paper: Does bargaining matter in the small firm's matching Mmodel? (2010)
Working Paper: Does Bargaining Matter in the Small Firm's Matching Model? (2010)
Working Paper: Does Bargaining Matter in the Small Firm Matching Model? (2010)
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