Does bargaining matter in the small firms matching model?

Olivier L'Haridon, Franck Malherbet and Sebastien Perez-Duarte

Labour Economics, 2013, vol. 21, issue C, 42-58

Abstract: In this article, we use a stylized model of the labor market to investigate the effects of three alternative and well-known bargaining solutions. We apply the Nash, the Egalitarian and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solutions in the small firm's matching model of unemployment. First, we show that the Egalitarian and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solutions are easily implementable within search-matching economies. Second, our results show that even though the traditional results of bargaining theory apply in the context of search-matching economies, they are quantitatively weaker than expected compared to the results established in the earlier literature. In addition, and excluding a model with on-the-job search, it appears that the policy implications of labor taxes and employment protection are not very sensitive to the choice of the bargaining solution.

Keywords: Search and matching models; Bargaining theory; Nash; Egalitarian; Kalai–Smorodinsky (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 J20 J60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Does bargaining matter in the small firms matching model? (2013)
Working Paper: Does bargaining matter in the small firm's matching model? (2011)
Working Paper: Does Bargaining Matter in the Small Firm’s Matching Model? (2011)
Working Paper: Does bargaining matter in the small firm's matching Mmodel? (2010)
Working Paper: Does Bargaining Matter in the Small Firm's Matching Model? (2010)
Working Paper: Does Bargaining Matter in the Small Firm Matching Model? (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:labeco:v:21:y:2013:i:c:p:42-58

DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2012.12.002

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