Internet-Based Corporate Disclosure and Market Value: Evidence from Latin America
Maximiliano González and
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Maximiliano González: School of Management, Universidad de los Andes
No 29, Galeras. Working Papers Series from Universidad de Los Andes. Facultad de Administración. School of Management
Agency theory provides a strong link between dividend policy and ownership structure (Rozeff, 1982; Easter-brook, 1984; Jensen, 1986): managers acting in favor of the controlling shareholders increase dividends to reduce agency cost, especially when external financing is needed. Empirically, Moh'd, Perry and Rimbey (1995) show for the U.S. market that, in fact, managers tend to adjust dividends in response to their agency cost/transaction cost tradeoff.
Pages: 20 pages
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Journal Article: Internet-based corporate disclosure and market value: Evidence from Latin America (2013)
Working Paper: Internet-Based Corporate Disclosure and Market Value: Evidence from Latin America (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uac:somwps:029
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