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Internet-Based Corporate Disclosure and Market Value: Evidence from Latin America

Maximiliano González and Urbi Garay
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Maximiliano González: School of Management, Universidad de los Andes

No 29, Galeras. Working Papers Series from Universidad de Los Andes. Facultad de Administración. School of Management

Abstract: Agency theory provides a strong link between dividend policy and ownership structure (Rozeff, 1982; Easter-brook, 1984; Jensen, 1986): managers acting in favor of the controlling shareholders increase dividends to reduce agency cost, especially when external financing is needed. Empirically, Moh'd, Perry and Rimbey (1995) show for the U.S. market that, in fact, managers tend to adjust dividends in response to their agency cost/transaction cost tradeoff.

Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2010-10-02
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Related works:
Journal Article: Internet-based corporate disclosure and market value: Evidence from Latin America (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Internet-Based Corporate Disclosure and Market Value: Evidence from Latin America (2010) Downloads
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