Identification in First-Price and Dutch Auctions when the Number of Potential Bidders is Unobservable
Artyom Shneyerov () and
Chi Leung Wong
Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics
Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specific, unobservable sets of potential bidders.
Keywords: auctions; identification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2008-10-01, Revised 2008-10-01
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Journal Article: Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubc:pmicro:artyom_shneyerov-2008-12
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