Identification in First-Price and Dutch Auctions when the Number of Potential Bidders is Unobservable

Artyom Shneyerov () and Chi Leung Wong

Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specific, unobservable sets of potential bidders.

Keywords: auctions; identification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2008-10-01, Revised 2008-10-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubc:pmicro:artyom_shneyerov-2008-12

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