Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable
Artyom Shneyerov () and
Chi Leung Wong
Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 72, issue 2, 574-582
Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specific, unobservable sets of potential bidders.
Keywords: Nonparametric; identification; Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Identification in First-Price and Dutch Auctions when the Number of Potential Bidders is Unobservable (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:2:p:574-582
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