Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion

Gorkem Celik

Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: I study a multi-player mechanism design problem where the players are able to collude. I characterize the extent that the principal can link the compensation level of one of these players to the production performance of the other. I use this characterization result to identify the optimal contract for a principal with budget constraints.

Keywords: Collusion; Mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 0 pages
Date: 2004-01-23, Revised 2008-01-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubc:pmicro:celik-04-01-23-02-48-07

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