Details about Gorkem Celik

Access statistics for papers by Gorkem Celik.

Last updated 2025-03-15. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pce23

Working Papers

2025

1. Informative Certification: Screening vs. Acquisition
   Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

2024

2. Selling Certification of Private and Market Information
   Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers, Berlin School of Economics

2022

3. Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures
   Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
   Also in Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition (2018) View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures, Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell (2023) View citations (1) (2023)

2020

4. Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider
   Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
   See also Journal Article Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider, RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation (2021) View citations (1) (2021)

2016

5. Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation
   Working Papers, Nazarbayev University, Department of Economics
   Also in Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum (2015)
   See also Journal Article Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier (2017) View citations (3) (2017)

2011

6. Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design
   Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics View citations (5)
   See also Journal Article Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design, Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons (2016) View citations (5) (2016)

2008

7. Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion
   Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics
8. Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism
   Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics View citations (9)
   See also Journal Article Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (2011) View citations (17) (2011)
9. Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision
   Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics View citations (14)
   See also Journal Article Mechanism design with collusive supervision, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (2009) View citations (40) (2009)
10. Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints
    Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (2006) View citations (9) (2006)
11. To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes
    Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics View citations (1)

2006

12. Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation
    Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics View citations (2)
    See also Journal Article Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter (2009) View citations (23) (2009)

Journal Articles

2025

1. IDEAL DEFAULT FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES EFFICIENTLY
   International Economic Review, 2025, 66, (1), 201-221

2023

2. Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures
   Journal of Industrial Economics, 2023, 71, (1), 256-290 View citations (1)
   See also Working Paper Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series (2022) (2022)

2021

3. Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider
   RAND Journal of Economics, 2021, 52, (2), 314-333 View citations (1)
   See also Working Paper Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series (2020) (2020)

2017

4. Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation
   International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2017, 54, (C), 148-174 View citations (3)
   See also Working Paper Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation, Working Papers (2016) (2016)

2016

5. Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design
   Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 2016, 49, (1), 374-411 View citations (5)
   Also in Canadian Journal of Economics, 2016, 49, (1), 374-411 (2016) View citations (4)
   See also Working Paper Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design, Microeconomics.ca working papers (2011) View citations (5) (2011)

2015

6. Implementation by Gradual Revelation
   RAND Journal of Economics, 2015, 46, (2), 271-296 View citations (5)

2011

7. Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 73, (2), 375-387 View citations (17)
   See also Working Paper Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism, Microeconomics.ca working papers (2008) View citations (9) (2008)

2009

8. Mechanism design with collusive supervision
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144, (1), 69-95 View citations (40)
   See also Working Paper Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision, Microeconomics.ca working papers (2008) View citations (14) (2008)
9. Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation
   The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2009, 9, (1), 33 View citations (23)
   See also Working Paper Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation, Microeconomics.ca working papers (2006) View citations (2) (2006)

2008

10. Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties
    The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2008, 8, (1), 45 View citations (4)
11. On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers
    Review of Economic Design, 2008, 12, (3), 209-227 View citations (1)

2006

12. Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2006, 56, (1), 37-44 View citations (9)
    See also Working Paper Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints, Microeconomics.ca working papers (2008) View citations (1) (2008)