To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes

Gorkem Celik and Serdar Sayan

Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we develop a model of law enforcement with the possibility of corruption between enforcers and potential offenders. We study how the violation rate changes with the level of the fine imposed on violations. We find, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, that the fine level that minimizes violations can be intermediate rather than large. Finally, we study conditions under which different fine levels would be optimal.

Keywords: Corruption; Law Enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D78 D82 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2005-08-03, Revised 2008-08-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubc:pmicro:celik-05-08-03-12-50-26

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