Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints

Gorkem Celik

Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: We study an adverse selection problem, where an agent is able to understate his productivity, but not allowed to overstate it. The solution to this problem is generally different than the solution to the standard problem, where no restriction is made on the statements of the agent. We identify a sufficient condition, that does not depend on the distribution of types, under which these two solutions coincide.

Keywords: Mechanism Design; Incentive Compatibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 0 pages
Date: 2004-09-13, Revised 2008-08-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubc:pmicro:celik-04-09-13-05-50-40

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