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What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach

Vadim Marmer (), Artyom Shneyerov () and Pai Xu working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: We develop a nonparametric approach that allows for discrimination among alternative models of entry in first-price auctions. Three models of entry are considered: those of Levin and Smith (1994), Samuelson (1985), and a new model in which the information received at the entry stage is imperfectly correlated with bidder valuations. We derive testable restrictions of these models based on how the pro-competitive selection effect shifts bidder valuation quantiles in response to an increase in the number of potential bidders.

Keywords: First-price auctions; models of entry; selective entry; selection effect; nonparametric estimation; quantiles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C12 C14 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 56 pages
Date: 2007-11-22, Revised 2011-02-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ecm
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Journal Article: What model for entry in first-price auctions? A nonparametric approach (2013) Downloads
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