What model for entry in first-price auctions? A nonparametric approach

Vadim Marmer (), Artyom Shneyerov and Pai Xu

Journal of Econometrics, 2013, vol. 176, issue 1, 46-58

Abstract: We develop a selective entry model for first-price auctions that nests two polar models often estimated in the empirical literature on auctions, Levin and Smith (1994), and Samuelson (1985). The selective entry model features a pro-competitive selection effect. The selection effect is shown to be nonparametrically identifiable, and a nonparametric test for its presence is proposed. This test can be used to discriminate between the two polar models.

Keywords: First-price auctions; Models of entry; Selective entry; Selection effect; Nonparametric estimation; Quantiles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C12 C13 C14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (57)

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Working Paper: What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:econom:v:176:y:2013:i:1:p:46-58

DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2013.04.005

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