On the optimality of bargaining outcomes in the Collective-Particularistic multilateral bargaining game

Daniel Cardona and Antoni Rubí-Barceló ()

No 53, DEA Working Papers from Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada

Abstract: This note analyzes the efficiency properties of the equilibrium in a multilateral bargaining game in which a legislature divides a budget among collective and particularistic goods. We extend the model of Volden and Wiseman (2007) by considering smooth utility functions and consensus requirements ranging from simple-majority to unanimity. We show that when the private valuation of the private good is relatively high, only unanimity induces an (ex-ante) Pareto efficient outcome. Moreover, optimality can be easily attained by using sequential negotiations, independently of the majority requirement.

Keywords: Non-cooperative bargaining; sequential negotiantion; voting; quota rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubi:deawps:53

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