Investments in managerial skills and bargaining over inputs

Daniel Cardona and Antoni Rubí-Barceló ()

No 54, DEA Working Papers from Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada

Abstract: This paper analyzes the incentives of the members of a committee to acquire skills, when they will share a fixed budget among them in ex-post negotiations. Skills are interpreted as the ability to manage a collective budget, in the sense that shares assigned to skilled agents generate positive externalities to all members. In this setting, the equilibrium generally displays an over-qualified population.

Keywords: Investments; Hold-up; Multilateral bargaining; Skills; Externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubi:deawps:54

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