Environmental policy instruments and strategic restraint: caps versus taxes

Daniel Cardona, Jenny De Freitas and Antoni Rubí-Barceló ()

No 90, DEA Working Papers from Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada

Abstract: In the debate about options for abatement of carbon dioxide emissions, two instruments are considered: a cap on emissions (a command-and-control instrument) and a tax on emissions (a market-based instrument). One of the arguments used in this debate is related to the political manipulation that interest-groups may promote under each of these two regulatory systems. This study compares the performance of caps and taxes when the choice of the policy-maker is sensitive to the pressure of lobbies.

Keywords: environmental regulation; taxes; caps; lobbying; strategic restraint. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H23 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubi:deawps:90

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