A note on optimal tax evasion in the presence of merit goods

Rosella Levaggi and Francesco Menoncin (menoncin@eco.unibs.it)

Working Papers from University of Brescia, Department of Economics

Abstract: In a recent article Davidson, Lawrence and Wilson propose a model showing that, in the presence of distortionary taxations and goods of different quality, tax evasion can be an optimal device. Here, we show that this result, although quite interesting, cannot be generalised to a framework where Government activity consists of supplying merit goods and levying taxes to finance their provision.

Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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