Markets and Contracts

Alberto Bisin, John Geanakoplos, Piero Gottardi, Enrico Minelli and Heracles Polemarchakis

Working Papers from University of Brescia, Department of Economics

Abstract: Economies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of the model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit modeling of private information. Sellers have discretion over deliveries on contracts; this is in common with economies with default, incomplete contracts or price rigidities. Competitive equilibria exist and anonymous markets are viable. But, for a generic economy, there exist Pareto improving interventions via linear, anonymous taxes.

Date: 2009
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Related works:
Journal Article: Markets and contracts (2011)
Working Paper: Markets and contracts (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubs:wpaper:0915

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