Competitive Markets with Private Information on Both Sides

Martin Meier, Enrico Minelli and Herakles Polemarchakis

Working Papers from University of Brescia, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider competitive markets with asymmetric information. We intro- duce a notion of equilibrium that allows individuals to act strategically both as buyers and as sellers, and we prove that equilibria exist.

Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.unibs.it/on-line/dse/Home/Inevidenza/Pa ... /documento12287.html
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden

Related works:
Journal Article: Competitive markets with private information on both sides (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubs:wpaper:0917

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Brescia, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Matteo Galizzi ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).