Copyright and endogenous market structure: a glimpse from the journal-publishing market
Giovanni Ramello ()
POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS
This article explores the journal publishing industry in order to shed light on the overall economic consequences of copyright in markets. Since the rationale for copyright is among others to promise some market power to the holder of the successful copyrighted item, it also provides incentives to preserve and extend market power. A regular trait of copyright industries is high concentration and the creation of large catalogues of copyrights in the hands of incumbents. This outcome can be observed as the aggregation of rights and is one of the pivotal strategies for obtaining or extending market power, consistently with findings in other cases. Journal publishing is no different in this respect from other copyright industries, and in the last decade has experienced a similar trajectory, leading to a highly concentrated industry in which a handful of large firms increasingly control a substantial part of the market. It also provides a clear example of the effect of copyright dynamics on market structure, suggesting that a different attitude should be taken in lawmaking and law enforcement.
Keywords: copyright and market power; endogenous market structure; journal-publishing industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 O34 O33 L12 L69 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uca:ucapdv:146
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