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Is cooperation instinctive? Evidence from the response times in a Public Goods Game

Gianna Lotito, Matteo Migheli () and Guido Ortona ()

POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS

Abstract: In this work we use data on response times from a public good experiment to test the hypothesis that cooperation is instinctive, under the assumption that the longer the time of the decision, the less instinctive the choice. Results seem to support the hypothesis that cooperation is instinctive, while defection is 'rational'. Moreover, as the experiment is designed also to assess the effects of the consumption of relational goods on cooperation, we are also able to state that some types of relational goods, like team working, produce additional cooperation, but make it less spontaneous. We also detect that males seem to behave more instinctively than females.

Keywords: response times; cooperation; public goods experiments; gender effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2011-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed

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Journal Article: Is cooperation instinctive? Evidence from the response times in a public goods game (2013) Downloads
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